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The function of marketplace ideology to provide a framework that guides individuals’ 
conduct as consumers is well recognised, though less is known about how individuals 
address, resist or reconcile themselves to such ideology. Drawing upon “lifeway alibis”, 
assembled from a life course reading of de Certeauean tactics, this paper deepens our 
understanding of how the ideology of nutritionism is renegotiated in the context of 
dietary health to better accommodate individuals’ life events, circumstances, and timing 
in lives.  Based on interpretations of interview data, we argue that biographical matrices 
must be observed as principal facilitators for critical reflexivity beyond antagonistic and 
politico-collective motivations. Here, we consider critically reflexive behaviour – or 
unruly bricolage – to be organised around dynamic life experiences and circumstances 
rather than statically against marketplace ideology itself.  This outlook prompts us to 
recognise biography as a catalyst for circumventing certain ideological mandates while 
the overall ideology remains perpetuated throughout circumvention. 









Regardless of how much access individuals are given to ‘expert’ and ‘official’ 
guidelines on health and well-being, the responsiblised consumer has the freedom to 
find authority in personal experience and, quite simply, do his or her own thing (Batat, 
2016; Kristensen, Askegaard and Jeppesen, 2013). As outlined by Thompson (2005: 
236), today’s populations are counselled by experts across a range of fields but are 
simultaneously expected to choose for themselves when it comes to matters of personal 
responsibility thus creating a “postmodern hedge” which “gives consumers greater 
cultural license to consider alternative viewpoints”. To contend with this postmodern 
hedge, marketing theory has drawn liberally from Michel de Certeau's (1984) 
theorisation of the tactical social subject and has explored how consumers can 
reflexively defy the programmatic influence of technocrats, expert guidelines or a 
dominant ordering (Dobscha, 1998; Holt, 2002; Moisio and Askegaard, 2002; Ozanne 
and Murray, 1995; Roux, Guillard and Blanchet, 2017). However, much of this work 
has focussed extensively on mapping the identity-oriented, socially motivated, or 
counter-culturally informed aspects of defiance rather than anatomising the more 
personal and intimate bases for reflexivity (Nixon and Gabriel, 2016). 
In this paper, we emphasise the interplay between ideological structures and 
individuals’ unique biographical conditions as an important theoretical site for 
understanding personal reflexivity. We argue that health is inherently ideological 
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whereby ideology shapes and moulds what and how individuals desire, what is 
important or tenable to them, and hence their health-oriented objectives and goals 
(Conrad, 1992; Vitus, 2017). In the words of Dey and Lehner (2017: 755-756) 
“ideology works primarily to shape the way people conduct themselves by suggesting 
particular normative orientations of what it means to lead a ‘good life’… ideology has a 
fantasmatic dimension, whose primary function is to make a given reality palatable.” 
While dietary health is concerned with making choices about how we use food 
to maintain and promote bodily health, the dominant ideology that supplies the 
normative orientations for such choices has been labelled “nutritionism” (Scrinis, 2008). 
Nutritionism is characterised by thinking about eating primarily in terms of nutrient 
intake while undermining and displacing other less calculative ways of understanding 
food such as how it is produced or its cultural and ecological properties. Examples of 
nutritionism in operation include: marketing claims which concern the addition or 
subtraction of specific nutrients (e.g. Vitamin D fortified milk, fat-reduced butter); 
structured (and often marketised) courses of eating where nutrients are isolated for 
approach or avoidance (e.g. the Atkins diet’s limitation of carbohydrates); and nutrient-
by-nutrient accountability through personal logs and biometric data applications (e.g. 
FatSecret, MyFitnessPal). It is characterised by discourses of precision, control, and 
intervention and encourages normative adoption of mechanisms linked to nutritional 
isolation and calculation such as the glycemic index (GI), front-of-pack nutrition 
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labelling, and Recommended Dietary Allowance (RDA). The fantasmatic (i.e. fantasy-
based) dimension of nutritionism  centres on the allure of achieving optimal health, a 
long life, and even happiness through exercising personal control and being mindful of 
nutrients above all else.  
In this paper, we account for the reflexive pretexts that people draw upon to 
justify and reconcile their personal approaches to dietary health with the prescriptions, 
expectations and fantasy appeals of nutritionism.  We explore not so much how 
consumers reject nutritionism but rather how they adjust it to fit their lives. In doing so, 
we seek to address the following research questions: 1. How do consumers find ways of 
“making do” with the mandates of a dominant ideology? and; 2. how does personal 
biography become invoked in addressing, resisting or reconciling oneself to that 
ideology? To address these questions, we supplement de Certeauean theory with 
insights from the life course perspective (LCP) (Devine, 2005; Hockey et al., 2014; 
Moschis, 2007). Together, these theories are used to support an analysis of narrative 
interviews with consumers who discuss and reframe dietary health as having less to do 
with a reductive focus on nutri-biochemical guidelines, and more with carefully 
interspacing these guidelines with the biographical matrices that food, for them, has 
historically been located within. Here, we are concerned with how the idiosyncratic 
knowledge, events, transitions and turning points that individuals experience over their 
lives (i.e. biography) can serve as pretexts for contesting ideological structures as well 
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as altering and approximating them to better fit with their life conditions. We refer to 
these pretexts as “lifeway alibis”. 
We provide several theoretical contributions. First, our conceptualisation of 
lifeway alibis situates biography at the heart of reflexive behaviour and identifies 
critical reflexivity as conducive rather than antithetical to the operation of a dominant 
marketplace ideology. We emphasise that ideology is perpetuated by the degree of 
freedom that subjects construct for themselves through lifeway alibis. Consumers can 
maintain a critical distance to the strictest mandates of ideology, while still orientating 
their lives according to approximations of its fantasy appeals.  Second, our work departs 
from identity-based and political convictions as explanations for resistant or defiant 
consumer behaviour (see also Heath, Cluley and O’Malley, 2017; Nixon and Gabriel, 
2016). Rather than being based squarely on anti-establishmentarianism or collectivised 
non-commitance, we situate concepts like reflexive doubt (Thompson, 2005) and unruly 
bricolage (Holt, 2002) within the logic of consumers simply being “discoverers of their 
own paths” (de Certeau, 1984: xviii).  This implies critically reflexive acts must be 
recognised as more than signifiers of antagonism and opposition, and appreciated as 





Theoretical Underpinnings  
The Ideology of Nutritionism & the Resisting Consumer 
No marketplace can operate in an ideological vacuum; rather all are subject to “a 
set of institutions, actors, practices, and discourses” which impose structure on how 
those acting within and upon them read (and misread) their activities, norms, objectives 
and even tastes and appeals (Sandikci and Ger, 2010: 32; Batat, 2016).  Many markets 
have been directly or indirectly structured by one particular body of institutions and 
practices described as medicalisation whereby “nonmedical problems become defined 
and treated as medical problems” (Conrad, 1992: 209). It is from attempts to medicalise 
the food marketplace – to treat food as a site for addressing medical problems – that the 
ideology of nutritionism can be identified.  Nutritionism encourages us to “think about 
foods in terms of their nutrient composition, to make the connection between particular 
nutrients and bodily health, and to construct ‘nutritionally balanced’ diets on this basis” 
(Scrinis, 2008: 39).  
Importantly, nutritionism like any ideology operates by interpellating (or 
addressing) people as “subjects”, such that subjectivity and ideology are to some extent 
jointly constituted (Dey and Lehner, 2017). Scrinis suggests nutritionism interpellates 
what he calls “the nutricentric person”, a consumer who must think about food in terms 
of nutrients above all else. Interpellation in and through a nutritionally reductive 
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approach to food hinges on consumers’ inability to determine the “healthiness” of food 
products for themselves and the trust they must place in producers’ disclosure of 
standard medico-scientific measurements i.e. nutrients (e.g. calories, carbohydrates, 
vitamins etc.).  Here, Scrinis (2008: 41) suggests “the assumption is that a calorie is a 
calorie, a vitamin a vitamin, and a protein a protein, regardless of the particular food it 
comes packaged in”, making the subject especially susceptible to food marketing 
strategies (e.g. “low fat”, “high in protein”). Nutritionism thereby mutates into a kind of 
“marketised” nutritionism, defined here as the prioritisation of nutritional thinking in 
both the development and promotion of mass-market products and experiences.   
Although marketplace ideologies strive to mete out an idealised framework for 
consuming, individuals have the agency to resist ideology, to work within it to bridge 
their own gaps, and to manipulate the “official” instructions if even the slightest 
incompatibility exists between themselves and it (Batat, 2016; Kristensen, Boye and 
Askegaard, 2011). The internalisation of ideologies such as nutritionism – or even 
medicalisation more broadly – therefore never fully succeeds, rather “there is always a 
residue, a leftover, a stain of traumatic irrationality and senselessness sticking to it, and 
that this leftover, far from hindering the full submission of the subject to the ideological 
command, is the very condition of it” (Žižek, 1989: 43). There is a kind of 
compensatory exchange between ideology and subject whereby the subject is not 
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expected to identify with all of the ideology’s mandates and prescriptions so long as 
he/she consumes loosely according to its ideals or fantasies. 
In terms of medicalising ideologies, the compensatory exchange is tied to what 
Fox and Ward (2006) suggest separates the medicalised “expert patient” – a citizen they 
define as someone who generally commits to the dominant and technocratic structures 
of health and illness – from the “resisting consumer” “who fabricates a health identity 
around lay experiential models of health and the body” (461).  Fox and Ward suggest 
resisting consumers will exercise a conscious distance between themselves and the 
technocrats’ prescriptions but ultimately still aim towards the ideological fantasy of 
‘good’ health, producing a multiplicity of appealing counterhegemonic identities and 
communities along the way.  Instead of opting out of arenas like health (or dietary 
health) completely, it is more likely that consumers make alternative, resourceful and 
even subversive choices within them. Here, they circumvent the mechanisms that they 
dis-identify with and replace them with solutions more befitting to themselves.  
Thompson (2005) speaks of communities of “reflexive doubt” where pockets of 
consumers unite under shared distrust of the recommendations by sanctioned experts to 
create alternative, more palatable health solutions for themselves. In a vein similar to 
Fox and Ward (2006), Thompson (2005: 246) suggests that reflexive doubt helps serve 
a collective “antiestablishment identity project” – for (resisting) consumers. Such 
explanations however tend to privilege what Nixon and Gabriel (2016: 41) call 
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“outward protest” or “antagonistic” assumptions of defiance. Such assumptions are 
useful but tell us less about how individual consumers – not just those united and 
socialised within expressive, identity-driven, and even politically-oriented communities 
– justify and make legitimate their reflexive acts in their personal lives. This brings us 
to consider de Certeauean theory in marketing and the role of the life course in “unruly 
bricolage”. 
 
Unruly Bricolage & the Life Course: Toward a Theorisation of ‘Lifeway Alibis’ 
The influence of Michel de Certeau’s thinking on marketing theory is best encapsulated 
in Peñaloza and Price’s (1993: 123) suggestion that, in response to marketing’s 
ideologising “structures of domination”, we must appreciate that consumers can seek 
out “moments of production, active re-creation and dispersed, tactical and make-shift 
resistance”. According to de Certeau (1984), market-based society can be analysed 
according to strategies, which are the technocratic procedures and (idealised) orderings 
of market spaces by institutions and prevailing ideologies; and tactics, which are the 
actual lived consumption practices that people participate in within these spaces. 
Tactics are not subordinate to a strategy but are, for de Certeau, ways of adapting to it or 
even distorting it. 
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De Certeau’s position has advanced the perspective that not only can individuals 
discount marketplace rubric and actively renegotiate and transform marketplace 
resources and conditions as “reflexively defiant consumers” (Ozanne and Murray, 1995) 
or “unruly bricoleurs” (Holt, 2002), but by matching their tactics with like-minded 
others they can form loose participatory units of sense-making, knowledge exchange 
and interpretation such as “reflexive communities” (Kristensen et al., 2011) or “cultures 
of unruly bricolage” (Brownlie and Hewer, 2009).  Here, terms such as bricoleur, 
bricolent and bricolage signify the manipulation and improvisation of the resources, 
meanings and conditions around oneself, while unruly and reflexive suggest the self-
realised circumvention of the rules to allow for this.  
Altogether, reflexive-unruly bricolage is not about countervailing or rejecting, 
but rather it occurs through what de Certeau (1984, xii) calls “poiesis”, the means of 
reconfiguring, diverting, and making-do with the information and objects that are given. 
There is, however, a peculiar gap in understanding what informs and helps substantiate 
poiesis on a pragmatic level or, rather, what the personal and practical lived foundations 
are for engaging in poietic displays of unruliness.  Diverting established rules or 
circumventing legitimate best-practice within markets where there are high risks for 
choosing to do so (e.g. health consequences, death) could be criticised as personally 
irresponsible, reckless or even perilous (Kristensen et al., 2013; Ulver-Sneistrup et al., 
2011). While these markets are often characterised by panopticism and surveillance to 
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ensure conformity, it is plausible that the bricolent consumer may likely try to insulate 
him or herself from criticism and dissonance by harbouring personal excuses and 
justifications.  
Keinan et al. (2016), for example, recently drew attention to the importance of 
justification for consumers when engaging in behaviours contrary to economic best-
practice and rationality. Importantly, the authors use the term “alibi” in conceptualising 
how consumers justify the seemingly wasteful or irrational purchase of luxury products 
by pointing to the utilitarian features of their indulgences. We share with Keinan and 
colleagues the term alibi to explore justification for reflexive unruliness but we adopt a 
very different meaning. Rather than being operationalised at product-level, we view 
alibis as justifications at a behavioural-level and anchored to the particularities of time 
and space in consumers’ lives.  
To help us theorise our time-space contextualisation of alibis for tactical-
reflexive behaviour, we look to the life course perspective (LCP) which has emerged as 
an organising framework for understanding the instability and flux of peoples’ life 
projects and themes and how this impacts how they behave and adapt (Moschis, 2007).  
The LCP considers the influence of interpersonal and socio-ecological factors such as 
built and social environments, macro institutions, social networks and families on the 
patterns of peoples’ consumption as they unfold over time (Devine et al., 2000). Thus, 
the LCP may lend a way of enriching and deepening de Certeauean theory by providing 
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the biographical background for one’s tactical manipulation of the ideologies that try to 
guide them.  If we consider de Certeau’s tactics to be those “clever tricks, knowing how 
to get away with things” (1984: xix), then the LCP provides the accumulation of 
conditions and events that provoke the inspiration and technical knowledge to actually 
facilitate and justify these tricks.  
While the LCP has been criticised as linear in terms of its assumption of stability 
over the fixed stages of life course trajectories (Hockey et al., 2014), such an 
assumption overlooks integration with consumers’ unruly bricolage which is 
conceivably impacted by and impacts upon their temporal and spatial pathways.  Thus, 
by recognising poststructural, tactical manoeuvres of consumers via “‘wandering lines’ 
(“lignes d’erre”)” or “‘indirect’ or ‘errant’ trajectories obeying their own logic” (de 
Certeau, 1984: xviii), past events can be acknowledged for their value in shaping and 
rationalising present tactics while current circumstances are acknowledged for their 
impact on interpreting and retrospectively defending past tactics.   
By integrating de Certeauean theory with the temporal and spatial narratives of 
the LCP we aim to develop the concept of “lifeway alibis”, which we tentatively define 
as individuals’ subjective reading of real or imagined personal, socio-cultural, and 
historical life conditions to justify the tactical disruption, deflection, and reconfiguration 
of ideologies’ structuring influence over them. Within the scope of the current study we 
capture how reflexive food consumers draw upon biographical bases to justify their 
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tactical manipulation and distortion of the technocratic mandates of the dominant 
ideology shaping dietary health (nutritionism).  
 
Methods  
Our empirical material was collected as part of a wider interpretive investigation into 
the impact of life patterns on consumption whereby we interviewed 24 informants who 
spoke at length about their food choices and lay perceptions of dietary health.  Unlike 
recent work in the area of the life course and food consumption, we adopted an open-
eligibility criterion for informant participation instead of restrictions based on issues 
related to body weight or diagnosis with a diet-related illness (c.f. Cronin et al., 2015). 
Our sampling message simply required that informants could speak candidly about their 
personal understandings of dietary health, their opinions on how it is promoted, and 
how they eat (see also Furst et al., 1996). From this, we recruited informants from 
Ireland and England through flyers posted at public spaces and snowball referrals over 
the course of 2015-2016. By not limiting our analysis to a specific problem, label or 
control, a mixed informant sample afforded us the opportunity to explore a range of life 
course perspectives that varied in terms of age, upbringing, life stage transitions, living 
locations, personal regimes, social-role demands, work or study engagements, 
friendship networks, family constellations and nationality (see Table 1).   
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INSERT TABLE 1 
The interviews began with general grand tour questions about informants’ social 
and familial backgrounds, work lives, and personal relationships which set the scene for 
follow-up prompts and probes. We queried whether and how informants conformed to 
dietary standards or deviated from them and what the reasons for their conformity or 
circumvention were. Importantly, the interviews were not constrained by a rigid, 
economic view of the life course wherein time is analysed as a unidirectional linear ﬂow 
(Hockey et al., 2014).  We were mindful of the complexities by which informants 
account for their life course trajectories and the malleability by which they might draw 
upon real or imagined past events to justify the present, or use present events to 
vindicate the past.  
The life course perspective (LCP) is similar in some ways to an existential-
phenomenological approach in that our course of dialogue with informants was 
designed to allow them to freely elucidate first-person accounts of their lived 
experiences.  To focus the interviews, our discussions centred on specific temporal, 
social and historical contexts where “life stories” could emerge (Devine, 2005).  That 
being said, we were mindful of the critiques of “individualist” interview techniques 
which centre on the prioritisation of the individual subject while underrepresenting the 
cultural and structural complexity of social action (Moisander, Valtonen, and Hirsto, 
2009). We do not contest these limitations, though we argue that the LCP ameliorates 
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some of these issues as it seeks to capture and probe not just personal accounts from 
participants as they are lived, but also the manner and extent to which these accounts 
have been influenced by and are situated within changing social, cultural, relational and 
physical settings over time. The LCP places emphases not just on personal choices but 
also on how “timing and context” systemically shape and anchor choices and the way in 
which individuals relate to choice contexts (Devine, 2005, 125).  
Each interview was recorded following the consent of informants.  Interviews 
lasted between 45 and 90 minutes, were transcribed verbatim and pseudonyms were 
applied.  Analyses of the interviews were conducted in an iterative “part to whole” 
approach using techniques adapted from the constant comparative method and 
hermeneutic protocols (Spiggle, 1994).  The overall development of themes and 
interpretations involved ongoing engagement and comparison with the literature.  In 
keeping with the LCP and its emphasis on depth and idiosyncrasy, we present only the 
perspectives of a limited few individuals to illustrate each alibi (Devine et al., 2000). 
 
Lifeway Alibis: An analysis 
For the purposes of theory-building, we represent our biographical data across four 
emergent themes which each signal a separate but interrelated lifeway alibi. These 
inductively-derived alibis help theorise how consumers can establish “a degree of 
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plurality and creativity” from an ideology which they have no choice but to face (de 
Certeau, 1984: 30). We explore how lifeway alibis provide license for variety and 
versatility within nutricentric thinking and for engaging in something quite different 
from what nutritional technocrats likely intended. Here, our informants’ depth of 
personal reflection, rationalisation and defence for what they do contra to or in relation 
to nutritionism ironically demonstrates how reflexivity becomes critical to the operation 
of ideology.  Rather than representing resistance or dissent, the four alibis are 
symptomatic of how nutritionism has firmly established itself as the reality within 
which one must consume. 
 
Cynical distance: The metacognitive alibi  
Our findings reveal a lifeway alibi emerging from “the power of knowledge” (de 
Certeau, 1984: 36) or rather, the ability to learn from one’s personal history to navigate 
current spaces. Here, we explore how consumers’ memories are invoked to inform a 
keen sense of cynicism when navigating nutritionism and seeking to “provide oneself 
with one's own place” within it (de Certeau, 1984: 36). Nutritionism, for instance, is 
mapped heavily through marketing (Scrinis, 2008), and most conversations with our 
informants signalled a learned mistrust towards the idea of marketers operating as 
custodians for their personal dietary health.   
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 This acquired cynicism conforms with Wright (2002: 677) who suggests 
“marketplace metacognition refers to everyday individuals’ thinking about market-
related thinking”, while thinking about marketers’ guileful opportunism and persuasion 
attempts are “developmentally”, and to some extent, “historically contingent” (Friestad 
and Wright, 1994: 1). Such thinking, which develops over the life course, rather than 
incubated within resistant social formations, facilitates consumers’ reflexive and critical 
distancing from marketers’ discourses, thus working as one possible alibi to behave 
with relative agency within an ideological framework.  
First, let us examine Russel (Male, 23), an undergraduate business student and 
yoga enthusiast who recently diagnosed himself as gluten intolerant. By identifying a 
nutritional problem – gluten – and modelling his eating around this, Russel conforms to 
the primacy of healthism and reductionism that underpin marketised nutritionism. 
Despite such ideological consistency, Russel maintains cynical distance to the marketers 
and marketing attached to nutricentric thinking. Russel suggests that his choice to go 
gluten-free is not based on any kind of market influence, even if this belies heavy 
marketing efforts around gluten-free products at the time of this research. Rather, 
choosing a gluten-free diet for Russel is ironically based on his knowledge of other 
“more” marketised diets failing those around him. Russel suggests childhood memories 
of seeing his mother pour money into “mainstream” diets tied to fat-free/fat-reduced 
claims instilled in him the belief that marketers manipulate information for reasons of 
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self-interest and so consumers should always be somewhat critical and choose more 
niche solutions.    
Russel grew up noticing there were always “brands of diet [foods] and stuff” 
and “various [diet] books that my mum had picked up over the years”, but he does not 
recall any tangible benefits of such items on his mother’s dietary health – “it’s just 
something that didn’t really work out for her”. Here, personal memories “whose 
attainments are indissociable from the time of their acquisition and bear the marks of its 
particularities” (de Certeau, 1984: 82) are used as a tactic to act on the current and 
dominant field. Instead of blindly following his mother’s compliance with market-
driven education before him, Russel tries to “make do” with nutritionism by drawing 
critically upon his memories and educational background: 
“Since I’ve started Uni, and stuff like that, I hate going back home because I 
have such different choices, like, what I would buy compared to my mum (…) 
In terms of what I see on TV, whether it’s on a show or an advert, I think that’s 
when my, kind of, like, scrutiny comes into it. You know, if you listen to the 
way that things are worded, everything’s called ‘lighter’. I really love that, 
because usually it just means they’ve scooped the top off it. You know, you 
need that active-mindedness not to assume that something’s perfect just because 
it’s different or it’s marketed in a certain way [sic]. (…) It’s a weird part of 
branding, again. We can use all these scientific things. You know, they just 
praise this, kind of, ‘magic’ ingredient, and I’m always a bit, like, ‘well, I don’t 
care what computer graphics you’ve used. It’s not really stood out for me’”  
Russel’s reading of lighter products and marketers’ use of graphically enhanced TV 
advertisements appear to stem from his own “knowledge-based expectations” and 
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personal “memories about the features of persuasion attempts” (Friestad and Wright, 
1994: 3).  In response, he pursues what he considers to be a personalised philosophy 
that involves borrowing from select aspects of nutritionism – such as occasionally 
keeping track of protein, vitamins and calorie intake – while reconciling such reductive 
asceticism with “cheat days” and even “cheat hours” where he allows himself to eat 
whatever he likes:  
“I would like to think that I eat healthily, but I’m one of those people that’s very, 
into, like, ‘cheat day’ or whatever, or, you know, ‘cheat hour’.”   
Such thinking is of course another form of cynical distance which “is just one 
way - one of many ways - to blind ourselves to the structuring power of ideological 
fantasy: even if we do not take things seriously, even if we keep an ironical distance, we 
are still doing them” (Žižek, 1989: 30). Russel thereby does not completely reject 
nutritionism, instead he justifies a tactical balancing act as a more natural and 
trustworthy approach to dietary health than recreating the ideological agenda verbatim: 
“As long as I’ve got my protein and my meats, and then fruit and veg … I look 
at the ingredients and see, like, ‘Right, well as much as it’s got,’ you know, ‘X 
grams of protein, you’ve also shoved in, like, five cups of sugar.’ You know, it 
counterbalances it, so I’ve always looked in there… calories are a useful kind of 
generic indicator, I’m aware that it’s not the be all and end all of what it means.” 
Here, Russel is effectively still “doing” nutritionism but he invokes distance between 
himself and nutritional product tinkering.   He is cognisant that ideological mechanics 
such as calorie-counting constitute a “useful generic” platform to orient his personal 
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dietary regime as long as they are subject to criticism.  Conceptualised in this way, 
ideology does not simply produce constraints on agency but, instead, when viewed 
cynically might serve as a platform for the unfolding of hybrid-entrepreneurial tactics.  
Elsewhere, Margaret, (Female, 39) a suburban stay-at-home mother of two, 
shares Russel’s cynicism towards nutrient-fortified processed foods and “nutri-
washing”. Margaret suggests that her domestic life situation, its accompanying 
responsibilities and her preference for artisanship, provide pretexts for not being a 
passive recipient to pre-packaged nutritional completeness:  
“I think that’s all a load of marketing rubbish. It actually makes me really angry 
because it makes me think that people who make those products don’t actually 
care about the people eating their food, which is a completely different emotion I 
get than when I think about a farmer, an artisan bread maker or a cake maker. I 
think what they’re doing is they’re jumping on the bandwagon. They’re going, 
‘Oh, we know that people want this. We’ll put it in. We don’t actually know 
whether it works by putting it in that way’. I think a lot of the time, when they 
add things in, your body can’t absorb them. (…) Things like [functional food 
brand], again, it’s rubbish. I think we should eat butter. I think the whole 
‘cholesterol’ thing is a myth. I think the whole low-fat milk is a myth. If they 
just left milk as it was, you could absorb all the vitamins from it anyway, but 
because they’ve made it low-fat, there’s not enough fat to transport the vitamins 
and your body can’t absorb the vitamins (…) I think marketers are incredibly 
good at going, ‘What are people worried about? Let’s twist the knife. Let’s get 
in there.’” 
A particular concern for Margaret is marketers’ attempts to instil fear.  She takes a 
damning view of what she refers to as “myths” and avoids nutritionally-fortified food 
products not based on any uncertainty that nutrients exist but on suspicion towards the 
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way marketers leverage them. She draws on the importance of vitamins, though she 
expresses cynicism toward how they are delivered and absorbed. Importantly, Margaret 
suggests that her life transition to parenthood is what spearheaded her cynical thinking:  
“When I had kids, that really changed my relationship to food. As soon as I had 
children, I just felt they were so vulnerable that I just really wanted to know 
what I was putting in their bodies”. 
While only becoming actualised in parenthood, Margaret’s marketplace metacognitions 
have evolved over a lifelong project. As a child, she experienced the 1970s and ‘80s 
boom in convenience foods in the UK – a period where many meals became packaged, 
calorie-controlled, fortified with nutrients or reduced in fat. These products of 
industrialised and marketised nutritionism became introspected upon as “memory 
objects” (Hockey et al., 2014: 256) and invoked as a lifeway benchmark to avoid in her 
adult years:  
“I feel almost stupid about it now, because when I look back, I think, ‘How did I 
not know that this stuff was probably not good for my body?’ I think you grow 
up.  I was a child of the 1970s. I remember my mum and I talking about this.  
When I was 9 or 10 [years of age] and Crispy Pancakes came out, and French 
bread pizzas and this, that and the other, it was seen as this golden age. ‘Oh, you 
can get low-calorie biscuits and you can get low-cal yoghurts.’ It just seemed 
like it was really portrayed, particularly to women, I think, as the answer to 
everything. ‘You can have what you like, but you won’t get fat.’ I never even 
thought about how they replaced the fat or what they replaced the sugar with.” 
Margaret’s subjective reading of historic manipulation as personal alibi conforms to 
Hockey et al.’s (2014: 255) view of the life course as a malleable amenity grounded in 
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“the appropriation or reconfiguring of the past as a contemporary resource”.  Later in 
her interview, she suggests how the contradictions, indecisiveness and ignorance of 
compliant government institutions over her life enables the co-optation of nutritionism 
by industry, which sharpens her cynicism. Altogether, Margaret’s cynicism insulates her 
from the dubiousness of “experts” and technocrats and is premised on the belief that 
institutions such as industry and policy are likely to add to nutritional confusion and 
undermine what she feels is genuinely good dietary behaviour.   
 
Hybrid fatalism: The holistic alibi  
Another alibi that informants drew upon to justify tactical agency within the strictures 
of nutritionism was linked to fatalistic beliefs which fall under de Certeau’s (1988: 185) 
“act of believing”, or rather the belief in something “that is assumed to be invariable”.  
While there is a deterministic aspect to ideologies like nutritionism whereby social 
subjects turn control of their reality over to industry- or policy-defined experts, a 
number of our informants appeared to work from a deeper fatalistic alibi that 
ideologically imposed technocrats cannot ever have such control over one’s life. Rather, 
for them, reality is crafted and guided by something ineffable. As outlined by Fischer et 
al. (2007: 435): “Fatalism rejects a purely scientific cause-and-effect explanation of the 
world and presupposes the existence of an established, timeless order”. By placing 
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dietary health beyond the mastery of technocratic strategists, a defence is laid for more 
“holistic” forms of bricolage. Here, fate and nutritionism become reconciled together to 
“reciprocally define each other” (de Certeau, 1988: 185) leading to a hybrid, tactical 
form of fatalism where some control is possible – by the individual, but never the 
technocrat – and only if conducted under recognition of some larger spiritual order.  
Cristi (Female, 24), a Romanian national who used to play professional tennis 
and recently completed her third level education in the UK, largely eschews nutricentric 
thinking and nutritionally-fortified food products with the raison d'être that mastery over 
nature is impossible and life in general must be accepted as having a high level of 
sustained uncertainty.  As part of this, Cristi justifies her dietary regime as contingent 
upon parascientific superstitions such as the energies that surround and invade her food 
while she is cooking: 
“When I cook, I usually put on some nice music, or I talk to my mum or my 
boyfriend, just to get me, kind of, in a very positive mood. I never cook when 
I’m angry, because I think that my energy just transpires into the food, and then 
this negativity goes back in me. I prepare my meal, and then I have, kind of, a 
small ritual that when I sit down with a meal, I just look at it for, like, a minute, 
make sure that, you know, the ingredients are fine, and my food is nice, and I’m 
not going to sit down eating very annoyed, or in a hurry, or in a very negative 
mood.” 
Cristi’s domestic superstitions are grounded to her personal life history.  She was forced 
to retire from playing professional tennis due to a sudden and unexpected diagnosis with 
a congenital spinal disorder and has adopted the view that her personal wellness has 
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tacit links to supernatural causality or “a higher power” (Fischer et al., 2007: 436). The 
suddenness and unpredictability of her career-ending diagnosis constituted “a turning 
point” (Devine, 2005: 121) in her life course whereby she lost faith in claims of 
scientific certainty. Cristi now defends her unorthodox sensitivity to mysterious 
energistic forces in the environment by pointing to the source of evidence she knows 
best, her body: 
“It all started many years ago, five, six years ago. I used to be a professional 
sportsperson, and then I suffered from diastematomyelia on my spine, so I was 
paralysed. They said that I’d probably never be able to jump, run, bla bla bla. No 
one’s given any chances, so I said, “Okay, something has to change here, in my 
mind.” (…) I started changing my attitude towards absolutely everything: Food, 
friends, the way I sleep, if I exercise, if I do anything that my body needs to. I 
started listening to my body, what it says. Does it hurt? Do I sleep well? Am I in 
a good mood? I actually realised that food affects you so much (…) That’s, kind 
of, how I developed this idea of you have to be very careful what you put in 
yourself, because what you put in yourself, you ultimately get out of there.” 
Although she is no longer paralysed, the impact of Cristi’s unanticipated departure from 
professional sports has provided her with a platform from which she can justify her 
reflexivity.  Through her fate in her body and energistic interference, Cristi manages to 
“subvert the fatality of the established order” (i.e. of nutritionism) (De Certeau, 1984: 
17) and  chooses an approach to eating that is driven less by structured nutrient-by-
nutrient reductionism and more by sensitivity to body and mind. This hybrid approach 
allows her to appreciate the importance of nutritional constructs such as protein for her 
body but to reject the certainty of recommended intake levels: 
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“you need protein, let’s say, to recover and to build your muscle, or your organs, 
or whatever, but I wouldn’t say, “You have to eat 120 grams of protein because 
that’s what worked for me.” No, we spend, let’s say, a month figuring out what 
works for you, and then you start from there. I would never ever say to anyone, 
“Follow a diet that someone’s written about.” Get the principles, learn from it, 
ponder it, and get your own conclusions about it. Don’t just be a follower of 
what everyone says.” 
What is important here however is that even with her philosophy’s fatalistic distance to 
the scientism of nutritionism, Cristi never completely rejects the ideals of “control” and 
“intervention” which underpin that ideology. Cristi’s behaviour still maps onto the 
fantasmatic orientation of achieving good health and happiness through personal 
enterprise and making the right choices. Fatalism is merely used to relocate the locus of 
control away from the alienating precision and technocracy of nutrients to more 
personal and possibly more appealing embodied experiences. As Kristensen et al. 
(2013: 251) suggest, the body “becomes the instrument for ‘testing’ food” and thus 
serves as a conduit between health-related ideologies and the self.  
Elsewhere, Justyna (Female, 23), a Polish graduate who works with a small UK 
tourism service, experienced various food allergies and digestive problems over her life 
course but has recently come to position her ailments as fated. As her digestive 
problems worsened in the past three years, Justyna became interested in the ancient 
Indian protoscience, Ayurveda. Linked to the Karmic cycle, Ayurveda is based on the 
need for balance within one’s environment, body, mind and spirit wherein fate is listed 
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as one source of disease or illness. Drawing on this “science of living”, Justyna defends 
her approach to consumption by pointing to the predetermined constitution of each 
person:  
“Ayurveda takes into account not just the body but also the mind. There are 
three constitution types, which means that there are different – well, put it 
another way: you have all the different elements, so fire, water, air, earth, and 
ether. Everything made in the universe is constructed of these, so each of them 
has a different combination of those elements and each human is constructed of 
a different balance of these constitutions.  What that means is that every person 
has a different way; different types of food serve them well. (…) When you’re 
born, you have the different levels of these constitutions unique to you. 
Whenever something is out of balance, you need to eat or consume things in 
your life that are the opposite so that you go back to the stage of equilibrium. 
(…) In the science of living, calories are not talked about.” 
Markets, policies and nutritional science all blur together for Justyna in the 
fallacy of trying to rationalise what is fated. Nevertheless, similar to Cristi, Justyna still 
consumes loosely within nutritionism’s framework of control and intervention to 
achieve good health. For Justyna however, good health is grounded to controlling and 
achieving the loose idea of “balance” rather than nutritional precision. She has 
acclimatised herself to understanding that each individual is born into specific 
“constitutions” and that fate has a causal role in determining one’s health. We can take 
from this that, for some consumers, their allegiance to structures like nutritionism is 




Tribal Aesthetics: The social alibi  
A third alibi centres on de Certeau’s (1984: xvii) recognition that “strategic 
deployments, when acting on different relationships of force, do not produce identical 
effects” and his subsequent recognition that ideological strategies are tactically 
approximated according to consumers’ specific social situations and relationships. Due 
to the “fragmentation of the social fabric today” (de Certeau, 1984: xxiv), many 
consumers consider themselves part of disparate communities which each sketch out 
“the ruses of different interests and desires” (34) such as specific aesthetic interests. 
This leads to variegated approaches to following the ideology of nutritionism 
Over the past five years, Jordanne (Female, 21), a trainee management 
consultant and part-time fashion model has adapted how she eats according to “the 
look” of a friendship network rooted to the aesthetics of fashion, photography and 
beauty regimes. Throughout the course of her life trajectory, Jordanne has held senior 
positions within her alma mater’s student modelling society and worked a number of 
short-term internships with major cosmetics brands during her university studies. 
Working within an accumulated system of tribal attitudes, norms, and beliefs from work 
colleagues and friends who equate their social currency with the attainment of female 
beauty ideals, Jordanne speaks zealously about managing her food consumption in 
terms of achieving specific tribal aesthetics. Specifically, food’s conduciveness to the 
“legitimate” phenotype of her social milieu is core to Jordanne’s current lifeworld, 
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which enables her to appropriate nutritionism not for achieving the intended goal of 
health but for bodily aesthetics instead: 
“I read a blog on Cosmopolitan and it was basically saying what Victoria’s 
Secret models eat before they go to bed on the night of the shoot – they don’t eat 
bread, they don’t drink milk and they would eat salmon just for dinner. Then, 
they wake up with that ‘glowy effect’ (…) They don’t eat certain types of food 
at certain times of the day. They said bread isn’t meant to be good in the 
afternoon because it makes you puffy the [next] morning. So you’re meant to 
have bread for breakfast or lunch but not for dinner. (…) the bread, because it’s 
for longer term, means [the body] stores the sugars and then because you don’t 
use them straight away, it will either store them as fat or it will store them as a 
water bloatedness, and that’s what makes you look off or non-shiny in the 
morning.” 
Here, nutritionism serves as “a body of constraints” that partially frames how 
Jordanne thinks but, with reflexivity, she is capable of “stimulating new discoveries” 
(de Certeau, 1984: xxii) within her social milieu such as achieving her glowy or shiny 
effect.  
A tribal alibi was also elicited by some of our male informants who participate 
in and are particularly enthused by gym-going.  For this tribe of “gymmers”, dietary 
health is refracted through the interrelated pursuits of muscularity and the male banter 
that constitute that tribe.  For instance, Matthew (Male, 21), who recently transitioned 
into bodybuilding as a hobby and sources food from a specialist website called 
“MuscleFood”, considers a large and robust body aesthetic as an important staple within 
his circle of friends.  When asked about his awareness of any dietary health guidelines, 
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Matthew demonstrated fluency in the language of nutritionism but was keen to argue 
that his lifestyle and the life events leading to his interest in bodybuilding keep him 
exempt from recommended daily calorie intakes and the other mechanics of 
nutritionism. This corresponds with Shaw’s (2002: 291) suggestion that “‘popular’ 
health beliefs are linked to ‘common-sense’ knowledge” though there is also often a 
“strong interaction between this and expert systems of knowledge”. Matthew argues: 
“Saying 2,500 calories for men as a standard, while it is an average, it doesn’t 
really mean anything. If I’m going to the gym every day, I’m going to be 
burning a lot more calories than that and 2,500 calories isn’t going to be good 
for me. The same with saturated fat: saturated fat has been generalised, so you 
have poly and mono – those two – and they’re all different, especially from the 
sources they come from as well, and the impact that that has.. (…) my dinner 
yesterday was literally just meat … I am more aware of protein and what foods 
have got higher protein content because that is essential for building muscle.”   
Here, the ideology of nutritionism serves for Matthew “a set of rules with which 
improvisation plays” (de Certeau, 1984: xxii). He admits that he is susceptible to some 
of the scientised aspects of nutritionism (e.g. protein intake) because of its ostensible 
legitimacy in body building culture, but only if it is filtered by the mavens of his 
gymmer tribe. When looking back over his life, Matthew speaks of orienting himself 
away from mainstream diets for mainstream bodies towards the weblogs of personal 
trainers and body-building experts who repurpose nutritionism to assist with “packing it 
on” and “developing mass” rather than achieving a standard form of health. Here the 
language of nutritionism is adjusted and reconciled with tribal and insider-specific 
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jargon, or as suggested by de Certeau (1984: 6) “the artificial languages of a regulated 
operativity and the modes of speech of social groups has always been the scene of 
battles and compromises”. 
 
Externalism: The extra-corporeal alibi  
The final dimension of our analysis centres on informants’ approximations of 
nutritionism based upon the demands of other people’s bodies, places and things beyond 
one’s own corporeality. Here extra-corporeal alibis were forged from sensitivity to the 
broader environs, responsibilities, and objectives that one’s life is situated and 
assimilated within, or what de Certeau describes as the relationships that a subject must 
manage with its “exteriority” (1984: 123).  
The requirements for properly fulfilling previous or current relational roles – 
beyond fulfilling one’s own body – stands out as a major justification for unruly 
bricolage within nutritionism. Here, Moschis (2007: 296) suggests “social demands 
across the life course define typical life events and social roles in the person’s life that 
serve as turning points”. Spence (Male, 40), a South-African national and director of a 
start-up company in the UK, discusses being thrust into the role of parent to a child with 
autism as one such turning point. For Spence, thinking about food comes with special 
parental externalities that require him to problematise and see past the ideological 
32 
 
“myth of nutritional precision” (Scrinis, 2008: 42). Spence views nutritionism as a 
platform that he can start from, but ultimately as something that he must make “function 
in another register” (de Certeau, 1984: 32) or tactically distort for it to be better attuned 
to his daughter’s needs: 
“You look at things like the traffic light system, which, frankly, I think is a load 
of crap (…) Personally, my philosophy is, “Buy the best raw materials you can,” 
so we will always, try to buy free range or organic meat. We’re very lucky here, 
at [local food market], we can buy organic vegetables at the same price as 
normal kind of stuff. We adopt a gluten-free diet now because of Elizabeth 
[daughter], but for everyone in the family we do that. It seems to help us all. We 
don’t buy any processed foods, really. (…) We were probably carbohydrate-free 
for six months. You know, we made cauliflower rice and all that kind of thing. 
You do really miss bread and you really miss roast potatoes, or rice, or just nice 
stews, Basmati rice. I mean, for us it wasn’t sustainable as a family, but it was a 
good thing to go through, and I think it was good for Elizabeth’s general health 
(…) I think when you have kids it changes a bit, because you want to make sure 
you’re feeding them well.” 
Spence’s extra-corporeal responsibilities as parent are invoked when departing from the 
advice of technocrats, marketers and policy. Instead of following UK standardised 
front-of-pack labelling (“traffic-light system”), he opts instead for “organic” methods of 
production which are not taken into account by nutritional reductionism (Scrinis, 2008: 
40).  Spence calls the official guidelines “crap” yet he still uses nutritional terminology. 
In particular, he identifies nutri-biochemical constructs like carbohydrates and gluten 




Spence’s growing awareness of ethical issues in the wider food system are also 
invoked as externalities that influence how he defines health. To him, dietary health 
must be refracted through the health of the environment and “eating well” cannot purely 
be a matter of nutrients but also of ecology, leading him to place trust in eco-food 
campaigners rather than scientific or industry-appointed experts: 
“… he’s [Hugh Fearnley-Whittingstall] probably one of my favourite guys in 
terms of looking up to someone as a hero, or a good chef. The whole battery 
chicken thing, the whole way that people think that, actually, £4 is a fair price 
for a big, bloated, antibiotic, sort of, cruelty fest of chicken. Also, free range, and 
then you can buy organic. The biggest gap is between battery chickens and free 
range. I crunch the bones a bit, but if you didn’t have any teeth, you could make 
some dents in a battery chicken’s leg bone.” 
Here, Spence foregrounds animal welfare rather than nutritional constructs. The alibi for 
breaking compliance with nutritionism becomes concretised in beliefs that a good diet is 
not just defined by its ability to fuel the body efficiently, but is tethered to extra-
corporeal concerns such as where did the food come from?, how was it made?, what 
happened while it was made? and, what was involved?  
Sheenagh (Female, 48), a mother of three, who leads nature walks and foraging 
expeditions in her local area, emphasises the importance of considering dietary health as 
less of an isolated consumable and more as a relationship with externalities such as the 
environment, ecology, and those she brings on her walks. Having grown up and 
currently living on the rural west coast of Ireland, Sheenagh foraged for seaweed on her 
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local beach as a child but her interest in the practice grew more serious after studying 
horticulture as a mature student and becoming awakened to the natural beauty of her 
homeland. With age, eating for Sheenagh became less of a corporal and more of a 
pastoral act. She believes those who join her on her foraging expeditions will make 
better informed and sustainable choices based not simply on nutrition, but in terms of 
the entire ecological exteriority which food interacts with: 
 “It’s also become an absolute desire for people to know where their food is 
coming from and they're sick of these ‘food miles’ and [they’re] doing their bit 
for the planet and local [area] and they want to learn about local food and what's 
out there.  (…) It's learning a sustainable new skill… because you have to use 
the scissors, because you can only cut so much of the seaweed. (…) So it's 
filling their desire to kind of go back, I think, and retrace and reconnect, but it's 
also a way of looking to the future and having that new skill and feeding 
yourself.” 
Sheenagh’s recommendation that we “go back” perhaps predates her own lived 
experiences and emphasises an idealised or imagined past that is unbound by the rules 
of modernity and a food industry predicated on extraction, exportation and “food 
miles”. Such data speaks to tactical subversion of the life course itself more than the 
ideology of nutritionism and emphasises “that despite being placed in landscape and 
time, agency can be mobilised” (Hockey et al. 2014: 255). Through highlighting and 
working towards the (re)legitimation of an imagined past, Sheenagh argues she and her 




“Because there are times of the month for seaweed, it's natural – like a new 
moon or a full moon – when the tide is really low and then I give them the thing 
about that being about a spring tide; ‘it's actually springing off the water’. (…) 
you're connecting with the water and you're getting your feet dirty and you're 
pulling this incredible food out of the water. It really is a huge experience. (…) 
And it's the wow factor. People are like, ‘Wow’. And then the colours down 
there and scenery and someone said it's a completely immersive experience. 
Yes, you come away feeling very well after it.” 
While Sheenagh is indulging her own experiential motivations here, her idiosyncratic 
approaches to sourcing and eating food – and “feeling very well” – are justified by 
following the logic that health, for her, is not just based on biology but has over her life 
course become influenced by externality, interrelationships, and extra-corporeality.   
 
Discussion  
In a marketplace shaped and influenced by ideology, we have identified four lifeway 
alibis based upon cynicism, fatalism, tribalism and externalism that “are tactical in 
character” and enable consumers “to make do” and “to get away with things” (de 
Certeau, 1984: xix). Through these alibis, we demonstrated how biographical matrices 
are invoked by subjects to reflexively excuse themselves from subjugation to the finer 
details of nutritionally-entrenched ideology while still aiming for “good health” loosely 
within its fantasmatic framework. This provides important insights into how subjects’ 
reflexivity plays a role in the operation of ideology. For de Certeau (1984: 183), 
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“ideology and doctrine have an importance that is not given them by those in power”, 
rather it is those who are subject to their power that grant them importance. We 
observed how consumers query the validity and truth of identifying as a “nutricentric 
person” but still end up thinking about nutrients in their daily lives, justifying their 
position in relation to nutrients, and legitimating nutritionism at a level deeper than 
simply identifying with it uncritically. Elsewhere, this position is reinforced by Žižek 
(1989: 24-25) who argues that “the ruling ideology is not meant to be taken seriously or 
literally” and that “ideology's dominant mode of functioning is cynical”. It is within this 
understanding that the emergence of biographically informed “alibis” provides us with 
several theoretical contributions for marketing theory. 
First, understanding lifeway alibis as pretexts to unruliness within rather than 
outside of ideology helps to clarify that critical reflexivity does not equate simply with 
(or result in) wholesale defiance. Specifically, we submit that the presence of reflexivity 
confirms the operation of ideology rather than denies it. In dealing with the ideological 
apparatuses of nutritionism, our informants “subverted them from within—not by 
rejecting them or by transforming them (though that occurred as well), but by many 
different ways of using them” (italics added) (de Certeau, 1984: 32). Where Thompson 
(2005: 246) suggests communities of reflexive doubt serve “as an ideological antithesis” 
to the dominant structures in the marketplace and Ozanne and Murray (1995: 523) 
imply “reflexively defiant consumption takes place in subcultures acting as insurgent 
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movements”, we identify less of a united antithetical stance against dominant structures 
and more of a loose body of bricolent reactions closer to the original de Certeauean 
position. Critical reflexivity should not be automatically understood in terms of 
collectivised ideological antitheses, but perhaps might also be thought of as ideological 
polymorphism (or specifically, “polymorphic simulations” of the one ideology – de 
Certeau, 1984: xix). Marketplace ideology represents an amorphous fantasy that 
individuals co-construct, approximate, and make do with in their lives rather than a 
single imposed form that most will collectively and militantly try to reject. This requires 
us to depart from the assumption held by much of the previous de Certeau-inspired 
work in marketing theory that anti-establishment identity projects and antagonistic, 
liberatory or even radical reform is at the heart of reflexively defiant behaviour 
(Dobscha, 1998; Holt, 2002; Thompson, 2005). Instead, we situate reflexivity alongside 
rather than counter to the aforementioned establishment and follow Ulver-Sneistrup et 
al’s. (2011: 221) calls to reimagine the marketplace and its ideologising structures “as 
ubiquitous and as a prerequisite even for market antagonists”. 
Second, our work demonstrates how critical reflexivity may not always be 
organised against defined marketplace activities but towards broader life experiences 
and circumstances. Beyond even the personal and idiosyncratic subtleties of “everyday 
acts of resistance to marketing’” (see Heath et al. 2017: 1282), our analysis suggests 
consumers’ reflexivity does not always neatly target marketing activity alone. We 
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suggest reflexive action is often oriented towards subjective reifications of what an 
individual might believe threatens or disrupts his/her way of living at a particular time 
and place. Our informants, as “discoverers of their own paths” (de Certeau, 1984: xviii), 
used their critical reflexivity to query sometimes marketers, products or promotional 
techniques, but other times policy or public health, the ideological mechanisms of 
nutritionism more generally, and even the present and future conditions that they feel 
they must consume within. Here, the targets for critical reflexivity vary depending on 
the conditions and circumstances one finds oneself in over the life course. This helps to 
articulate and extend our understanding of how deviations from mainstream approaches 
to consumption have ties to individuals’ dynamic lifeworlds and “personal motivations” 
more so than political or intellectualised arguments against the market itself (Nixon and 
Gabriel, 2016: 41). 
However, in contrast to Nixon and Gabriel (2016) who make the claim that 
personal or non-politicised motivations for challenging the dominant consumerist logic 
are rooted in “psychological origins”, we submit the importance of biographical origins.  
We contribute here with the addition that beyond psychodynamic or even 
psychosomatic urges to resist hegemonic notions of consumption, emphasis must be 
placed on de Certeau’s (1984: xviii) “‘wandering lines” – or what we call biographical 
matrices (idiosyncratic life events, circumstances, trajectories, development and timing 
in lives) also. We emphasise that in response to ideological structures, no tactic by a 
39 
 
consumer can ever “secure independence with respect to [its] circumstances” (1984: 
xix), rather “a tactic depends on time” (1984: xix). Here we do not seek to privilege 
temporal aspects of the life course over psychological, social and structural forces but 
rather we call for greater appreciation of the connections between them in unpacking 
unruly bricolage and its reflexive underpinnings.  
Lastly, there is a final point of importance. Despite our efforts to capture a 
mixed informant sample, our data pool reflects those who are quite knowledgeable 
about dietary guidelines and have access to various foods. Future research might sample 
differently based on level of knowledge, affluence, or access and focus on how 
knowledge barriers and economic privileges intersect and interact with personal 
reflexivity to further complicate the relationships that subjects have with marketplace 
ideologies.  Future researchers might also explore how the concept of lifeway alibis – 
which has been developed in relation to a prescriptive and reductionist ideology 
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